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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
REBECCA ILENE VULGAMORE, )
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
______________________________)

NO. 47485-2019
TWIN FALLS COUNTY NO. CR42-17-2381

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Rebecca Ilene Vulgamore appeals from her judgment of conviction for trafficking in
heroin and conspiracy to destroy evidence. Ms. Vulgamore pleaded guilty and the district court
imposed sentences of twenty-five years, with eight years fixed, and five years fixed, respectively.
Ms. Vulgamore appeals, and she asserts that the district court abused its discretion by imposing
excessive sentences.
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Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
On March 10, 2017, an officer with the Twin Falls Police Department received
information that Ms. Vulgamore was traveling to a residence in Twin Falls and that the
informant was going to assist her in purchasing methamphetamine and heroin. (PSI, p.3.) The
officer stopped Ms. Vulgamore’s vehicle and found drugs in the automobile. (PSI, pp.3-4.)
Ms. Vulgamore was charged with trafficking in heroin, possession of a controlled
substance (methamphetamine), possession of a controlled substance (hydromorphone),
conspiracy to destroy evidence, and possession of a controlled substance (alprazolam.)
(R., p.47.) She pleaded guilty to trafficking in heroin and conspiracy to destroy evidence; the
parties agreed to jointly recommend a sentence of twenty-five years, with eight years fixed, and
Ms. Vulgamore waived her right to appeal unless the court exceeded the recommended fixed
term of confinement. (R., pp.81-84.) The district court imposed the recommended sentence of
twenty-five years, with eight years fixed, for trafficking in heroin and five years fixed for
conspiracy to destroy evidence, with sentences running concurrent. (R., p.109.)
Ms. Vulgamore did not initially appeal, but the district court re-entered the judgment of
conviction pursuant to a grant of relief in a petition for post-conviction relief. (R., pp.124, 130.)
Ms. Vulgamore appealed. (R., pp.132, 137.) Mindful of the fact that the district court imposed
the recommended sentence and that she therefore waived her right to appeal, Ms. Vulgamore
asserts that the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence.

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed unified sentences of twenty-five years,
with eight years fixed, and five years fixed, upon Ms. Vulgamore following her plea of guilty to
trafficking in heroin and conspiracy to destroy evidence?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed Unified Sentences Of Twenty-Five
Years, With Eight Years Fixed, And Five Years Fixed, Upon Ms. Vulgamore Following Her
Plea Of Guilty To Trafficking In Heroin And Conspiracy To Destroy Evidence
“It is well-established that ‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an appellant has
the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing the
sentence.’” State v. Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 5 (2010) (quoting State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294
(1997) (alteration in original)). Here, Ms. Vulgamore’s sentences do not exceed the statutory
maximum. See I.C. § 37-3732B(a)(6)(A); § 37-3732B(a)(6)(D); § 37-3732(c)(1); § 18-2603; §
18-1701. Accordingly, to show that the sentence imposed was unreasonable, Ms. Vulgamore
“must show that the sentence, in light of the governing criteria, is excessive under any reasonable
view of the facts.” State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460 (2002).
“‘Reasonableness’ of a sentence implies that a term of confinement should be tailored to
the purpose for which the sentence is imposed.” State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 483 (2012)
(quoting State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148 (2008)).
In examining the reasonableness of a sentence, the Court conducts an independent
review of the entire record available to the trial court at sentencing, focusing on
the objectives of criminal punishment: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of
the individual and the public; (3) possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment
or retribution for wrongdoing.
Stevens, 146 Idaho at 148. “A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the
primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of
deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.” State v. Delling, 152 Idaho 122, 132 (2011).
Further, “[t]he invited error doctrine is well settled in Idaho. A defendant may not request
a particular ruling by the trial court and later argue on appeal that the ruling was erroneous.”
State v. Griffith, 110 Idaho 613, 614, Ct. App. 1986). This doctrine applies to sentencing
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decisions. Id. Ms. Vulgamore acknowledges that the district court followed the plea agreement
and imposed the sentence that she requested.
Ms. Vulgamore addressed the district court at the sentencing hearing. She stated,
I come before you now as a grateful recovering addict. I’m a mother, and I am a
long time contributor to – a member of society.
I’ve had, you know, I’ve been very successful. I was caught up in my addiction
again.
Before that, I was a loving mother, a reliable employee, employer-employee. I’m
sorry. I’m a decent person. I relapsed. I regret my relapse of eight months great
– hugely. It’s completely destroyed my life.
My kids grow up now without a mother. I have let my family down again, my
employer down, my community down.
I don’t – I come before you now ashamed, embarrassed, full of regret, and I just
ask that you forgive my actions and have mercy on me today.
(Sent. Tr., p.15, L.18 – p.16, L.10.)
Ms. Vulgamore acknowledged that she suffered from a substance abuse addiction,
acknowledged that she had relapsed, expressed regret and remorse for her actions, and noted that
she is a mother and reliable employee. Mindful of the fact that the district court followed the
plea agreement and imposed the sentence she requested, Ms. Vulgamore submits that the district
court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Vulgamore respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate. Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded to the district court for a new
sentencing hearing.
DATED this 18th day of May, 2020.

/s/ Justin M. Curtis
JUSTIN M. CURTIS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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